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great advantages, 73 but it is equally clear that care should be taken by
those electing or intending to elect so that involuntary termination does
not occur. Thus, the attorney, accountant or other financial advisor must
explicitly explain all ramifications of an election, especially what events
may lead to termination. Further periodic checks are necessary to insure
that no subsequent events have come about which would cause disqualifi-
cation.
All the cases considered which were decided within the Fourth Circuit
seem to be justified under the statutes and regulations as they now stand.
This is not to say, of course, that there is no need for improvement in
the law itself, and suggestions for improvement have been made. Inflexi-
bility would seem to be the main problem and could be cured through
regulations or rulings. In cases such as A & N, the court itself performed
the task .7 The major statutory revision needed seems to concern section
1371(a)(4) which should clearly state that two groups of stock are not of
different classes for purposes of Subchapter S if the sole distinction be-
tween them is a difference in voting rights.
J. JEFFRIES MILES
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A PER SE
BREACH OF THE STEVEDORE'S IMPLIED
WARRANTY
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act' al-
lows a longshoreman injured in the course of his employment to waive
his compensation payments2 and sue a shipowner for damages on the
basis of unseaworthiness or negligence. 3 If the shipowner has supplied
defective equipment, for example, or has created an unsafe condition,4 he
will be strictly liable to the longshoreman for the "unseaworthy" vessel.'
9ln 1968, over 200,000 corporations elected Subchapter Status. 2 U.S. TREASURY
DEPARTMENT, TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS 271 (Comm. Print 1969).
71Text accompanying notes 33 and 62 supra.
133 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1970).
21d. at § 933(a).
3The Act's exclusive liability provision abrogates any independent tort liability of the
employer. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Berry Bros. Oilfield Serv., Inc., 377 F.2d
511, 514-15 (5th Cir. 1967).
4Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
'Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960); Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.,
321 U.S. 96 (1944).
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If the injured longshoreman himself is contributorily negligent, his dam-
ages are reduced in proportion to his negligence, as is customary in
admiralty law.' The shipowner may seek to relieve his burden of strict
liability, however, by impleading the longshoreman's employer for in-
demnity, and the shipowner will prevail if he can prove that the employer
breached his warranty of reasonable safety implied by the law.7 Recovery
for breach of warranty, however, is not necessarily reduced or barred by
the shipowner's own negligence.' In fact, the warranty is now construed
strongly in favor of the shipowner, as a recent Fourth Circuit case illus-
trates.
In United States Lines, Inc. v. Jarka Corp.,' a longshoreman return-
ing from lunch ashore stumbled over a coil of heaving line left by a
crewman of the ship in a narrow passageway near a hatch." The long-
shoreman, Kwarta, fell and injured his elbow on the hatch coaming.1 He
subsequently brought an action for damages against United States Lines
for unseaworthiness, and United States Lines impleaded the stevedoring
company for any damages which might be awarded to Kwarta. The dis-
trict court found the ship unseaworthy as a result of the misplaced line,
but reduced damages one-third for Kwarta's contributory negligence in
failing to see the hazard in time to skirt it. 2 United States Lines appealed
the district court's refusal to allow indemnity on the basis of Kwarta's
contributory negligence.
The question presented to the Fourth Circuit was whether Kwarta's
negligent failure to see the coiled rope was a breach of Jarka's implied
warranty of workmanlike performance. This warranty, which originated
in the 1956 Supreme Court case of Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic
Steamship Corp.,'3 has been called the essence of every stevedoring con-
tract; it has been held to imply a duty on the part of every worker to
perform properly and safely. Without undertaking an analysis of the
factors surrounding the accident, the appellate court in Jarka concluded
that the contributory negligence found as a fact by the district court was
6See 2 M. NORRIs, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 630 at 203 (3d ed. 1970).
7Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
'Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315
(1964).
'444 F.2d 26 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'g Kwarta v. United States Lines, Inc., 314 F. Supp.
112 (D. Md. 1970).
1314 F. Supp. at 114.
1 Id.
"Id. at 116.
13350 U.S. 124 (1956).
"Id. at 133-34. See also Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring
Co., 376 U.S. 315, 318 (1964) (discussing the Ryan holding).
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in itself a breach of the duty of reasonable safety."1
In equating contributory negligence with breach of warranty, the
court relied upon the recent Second Circuit case of McLaughlin v. Trelle-
borgs Angfartygs A/B.8 There, a longshoreman unsuccessfully at-
tempted to raise engine bearings from a lower deck with a defective hoist
supplied by the ship.17 The longshoreman had put himself in a dangerous
position near the hoist high above the deck when he slipped and fell. In
the indemnity action the court found him to be one-sixth contributorily
negligent. 8 The appellate court articulated a broad rule that a stevedoring
company implicitly warrants that its men will not negligently expose
themselves to injury and that reasonable safety extends to human, as well
as material, resources. 9 According to McLaughlin, then, any negligence
of the longshoreman, however slight, is not "reasonably safe perform-
ance" and amounts to a per se breach of his warranty.
It seems, however, that the McLaughlin rule followed in Jarka only
aggravates a built-in inequity of the maritime triangle. Unlike the initial
action against the shipowner for unseaworthiness, where there is a weigh-
ing of fault to apportion damages, recovery in the indemnity action is
"all-or-nothing": 0 either the warranty is breached or it is not; if it is, the
employer bears the full burden, even if the shipowner is 99% at fault.'
Under these circumstances, it would appear that a court should evaluate
the stevedore's conduct flexibly and cautiously, examining the totality of
the situation, including the nature of the hazard created by the ship-
owner,2 to achieve an equitable result.
In Jarka, however, there was virtually no analysis of the facts sur-
"1444 F.2d at 28.
16408 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 946 (1969).
'7408 F.2d at 1336.
,8id.
"Id. at 1337. The contributory negligence of the longshoreman is imputed to his
employer. Arista Cia DeVapores, S.A. v. Howard Terminal, 372 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1967).
"See Larson, Workmen's Compensation Employer's Independent Action Against
Third Party, 27 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 223, 249 (1970). See also Proudfoot, "The Tar
Baby": Maritime Personal-Injury Indemnity Actions, 20 STAN. L. REV. 423 (1968). The
possibility of tort-contribution was long ago dismissed as a means of adjustment in this type
of suit in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refining Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
21
1n Hartnett v. Reiss S.S. Co., 421 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852
(1970), a jury found one percent contributory negligence on the part of the stevedore, and
the court's mechanical application of McLaughlin compelled it to award full indemnity to
the shipowner despite the fact that shipowner was 99% at fault. The court said:
[lilt does seem strange that conduct by a. . . [stevedore] which deviated
only minimally (1%) from the norm should subject his employer to poten-
tially full liability.
Id. at 1018.
"See text accompanying notes 45-52 infra.
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rounding the accident; the appellate court's conclusion was automatic.
This is not to imply that the result reached in Jarka was or was not unjust;
rather the problem rests in blind application of the McLaughlin rule
which effectively forecloses any introspective examination into the fair-
ness of the result. Although the immediate judicial concern in Jarka was
and should have been breach of warranty, the fundamental justification
for indemnity nevertheless is fairness; to place the loss where it rightly
belongs.23 In a case where the longshoreman's negligence is minimal,
adherence to a per se rule plainly may lead to inequitable allocation of
damages.
2
The district court in Jarka relied upon the Fifth Circuit case of DIS
A/S Sverre v. Texports Stevedore Co. (Maples' case),21 in which a long-
shoreman fell while descending an unsafe ladder into a hold, and was
seriously injured.28 In striking disagreement with both Second and Fourth
Circuit precedents, the court in Maples found that the longshoreman's
40% contributory negligence was not a breach of the warranty of work-
manlike service.2? Although this appears to be the only Fifth Circuit case
exactly on point, other cases of that circuit have said that contributory
negligence is only a factor in evaluating the longshoreman's conduct
"See Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S.
315, 324 (1964).
4See, e.g., note 21 supra. It has been suggested that common-law indemnity, which
may loosely be called a quasi-contractual remedy, is barred by the statutory exclusivity of
the employee's recovery. See note 3 supra; note 54 infra. See also Brown v. American-
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 211 F.2d 16, 18 (3d Cir. 1954). Thus it has been held inappropriate to
rely upon concepts of primary (or active) and secondary (passive) negligence as a basis for
indemnity. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563, 569 (1958).
See also Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404, 420-22
(1969). However, in Weinstock, The Employer's Duty to Indemnify Shipowners for Dam-
ages Recovered by Harbor Workers, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 321 (1954), the author stated:
Granted that the effect of the act makes the existence of a contractual or
other relational duty running from the employer to the shipowner an
indispensable condition to indemnity, the questions remain: Under what
circumstances will it be held that such duty has been breached and, if it
has, that the breach may be held to impose a liability for indemnity? Once
the duty and breach are established, the equities are apt to return as a
factor in the deliberations of courts where the provisions of the contract
leave room for resort to such considerations. In short, the ultimate result
may be an amalgamation of the two theories of liability, in which the
quasi-contract principles are imported into the areas left open by agree-
ments between the parties.
Id. at 343.
-1966 A.M.C. 2032 (S.D. Tex. 1966), affd 387 F.2d 648 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 914 (1968).
nid. at 2033-34.
211d. at 2035.
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under his warranty. s Thus it appears that some attempt is made in the
Fifth Circuit to focus the inquiry not on the longshoreman's conduct in
isolation, but on the totality of the situation in which it might be said that
the stevedore acted with reasonable safety in a hazardous circumstance,
despite the fact that he did not behave perfectly.
The Supreme Court case of Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione
v. Oregon Stevedoring Co.,"  also relied upon by the district court, =
tends to support the position that negligence is only a factor in the breach
of warranty issue. Italia emphasized that contract and not negligence
standards should apply, recalling the Ryan decision:
[The Court in Ryan] pointedly declined to characterize the steve-
dore's conduct as negligent. . . . Although in Ryan the stevedore
was negligent, he was not found liable for negligence as such but
because he failed to perform safely, a basis for liability including
negligent and non-negligent conduct alike."
The Court in Italia added that the implied warranty to supply reasonably
safe equipment may be satisfied with less than absolutely perfect equip-
ment 2 and that the liability imposed under the warranty "should fall
upon the party best situated to adopt preventive measures and thereby
to reduce the likelihood of injury.""
Italia had approached the breach of warranty issue by defining the
scope of the duty owed by the longshoreman under his warranty and then
determining whether a standard of reasonable safety had been reached
consonant with such duty. The district court in Jarka therefore apparently
thought that even though Kwarta negligently stumbled, the stevedore did
not have supervision over the rope and hence the scope of the duty of
safety with respect to it was limited.3 This argument was rejected by the
court of appeals with the statement that Italia has "rarely been adapted
to preclude a judgment-over by the ship against the stevedore even when
the ship has breached its duty of care." 35 The weight of recent authority
seems to be in accord with this for two reasons.
2See, e.g., Lusich v. Bloomfield S.S. Co., 355 F.2d 770, 778 (5th Cir. 1966). The Third
Circuit has taken the same position, but only in dicta. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v.
Philadelphia Ship Maint. Co., 444 F.2d 727, 731 (3d Cir. 1971).
-376 U.S. 315 (1964).
1314 F. Supp. at 115.
31376 U.S. at 319.
321d. at 321-22.
13d. at 324.
s314 F. Supp. at 115.
3444 F.2d at 28. The Supreme Court has not since addressed itself to the narrow
question of what conduct may constitute breach of warranty of workmanlike performance.
19721
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First, under the McLaughlin" rationale the supervision and control
standard which defines the scope of a longshoreman's duty under his
employer's warranty became a subjective, internalized standard: the long-
shoreman's duty extends not only to the equipment with which he works,
but also to himself, and he will therefore always have the power to mini-
mize the risk of injury caused by his own negligence." Second, it is just
as easy to say that the stevedore company is the party best situated to
encourage its employees to take the proper precautions for their own
safety.- Against these considerations, therefore, the argument is less
persuasive that shipowner's supervision and control of the rope limited
the stevedore's duty of safety with respect to it.
Whatever force Italia has had in broadening the vision of courts
beyond the isolated negligence of an injured longshoreman,its vitality has
been consistently undermined by the earlier Supreme Court case of
Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrick Fisser,9 which espoused a narrower
view. The appellate court in Jarka relied upon Crumady as being "partic-
ularly apt" for the circumstance." In Crumady a longshoreman was
injured when a boom fell because a fellow worker put too much strain
on a winch." The ship's crew had improperly set the safety "cut-off"
switch on the winch, thereby allowing the heavy strain and giving rise to
the claim of unseaworthiness. Justice Douglas wrote that since the negli-
gence of the stevedores "brought the unseaworthiness of the vessel into
play," they had breached their warranty of workmanlike performance.'
The "brought into play" language has been widely cited, and Judge
'Note 16 supra.
37408 F.2d at 1337-38. But see 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION, § 76.43(a) (1970). Formerly, the stevedore's duty was not as simplistically
described. Larson perceives the distinction, in older cases, between creating a dangerous
condition and failing to discover it, and finds that generally in every case where the ship-
owner creates the dangerous condition, indemnity has been allowed where the stevedore
discovers the condition but continues his work. Similarly, indemnity has typically been
denied where the stevedore has not discovered the hazard created by the shipowner. This is
contrary to Jarka, of course. Another category confuses the distinction: this is where the
defect created by the shipowner is latent, but the stevedore activates it by his own miscon-
duct. Indemnity has been allowed in this situation and it is arguable that Jarka fits into it.
In the final category established by the author, indemnity is always allowed where the
stevedore creates the hazard and the shipowner fails to discover it. These distinctions based
on notice of course go far beyond the statement that the stevedore always has the power to
minimize the risk of his own injury.
3sThis argument was'used in Arista Cia DeVapores, S.A. v. Howard Terminal, 372
F.2d 152, 154 (9th Cir. 1967).
39358 U.S. 423 (1959).
4444 F.2d at 28.
"1358 U.S. at 425-26.
"Id. at 429.
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Bryan in Jarka also drew upon it to say: "The striking parallel [to
Crumady] is that in the instant case also the ship created the danger, but
the longshoreman brought it into play."4 It is indeed hard to imagine a
situation, though, in which a stevedore who is negligently involved in an
accident has not brought the unseaworthiness into play, since accidents
do not occur by themselves. Thus Crumady probably stands for the same
proposition that McLaughlin represents: any negligence of the longshore-
man which is a proximate cause of the accident and injury will be a breach
of the warranty of workmanlike performance."
Two years after it enunciated the doctrine of the stevedore's warranty
in Ryan, the Supreme Court in Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Naci-
rema Operating Co. 5 indicated that some types of conduct on the part
of the shipowner could preclude indemnity even though a warranty might
have been breached." Despite the subsequent broadening of the steve-
dore's liability under the warranty, however, Weyerhaeuser has been nar-
rowly construed. The appellate court in Jarka rejected the district court's
contention that the placement of the rope in the access-way of the ship
was conduct by the shipowner sufficient to defeat indemnification. This
comports with previous Second and Fourth Circuit holdings that such
conduct does not include the "mere creation of the unsafe condition.
'48
In fact, it is only when the shipowner actively hinders or prevents the
longshoreman from performing safely that indemnity will be denied.
4
1
It is suggested, though, that this rule be re-examined in light of the
more recent broadening of the stevedore's liability under his warranty. If
the law makes the longshoreman's conduct under his warranty harder to
excuse, perhaps it also ought to reconize that many types of misconduct
by the shipowner will now make the warranty easier to breach. 0 With its
10444 F.2d at 29.
"It is possible of course that a jury will find otherwise. See, e.g., Waterman S.S. Corp.
v. David, 353 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1965). In such a case it may be reversible error to upset
the verdict, even if it appears as a matter of law that the warranty has been breached. See
International Terminal Operating Co. v. N.V. Nederl. Amerik Stoomv. Maats., 393 U.S.
74, revg Albanese v. N.V. Nederl. Amerik Stoomv. Maats., 392 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1968).
For a treatment of proximate cause in indemnity actions see Reddick v. McAllister Lighter-
age Line, Inc., 258 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1958).
-355 U.S. 563 (1958).
"1See generally Larson, Workmen's Compensation Employer's Independent Action
Against Third Party, 27 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 223 (1970).
-1444 F.2d at 29.
"E.g., Mortensen v. A/S Glittre, 348 F.2d 383, 385 (2d Cir. 1965); Evans v. Overseas
Maritime Co., 330 F. Supp. 654, 663 (D.S.C. 1970), affd, 451 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1971).
"Southern Stevedoring & Contracting Co. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 388 F.2d 267, 271-
72 (5th Cir. 1968).
rhe Weyerhaeuser limitation on stevedore's liability is not now utilized as a factor
to be balanced with possible liability under the warranty. It is raised only as an affirmative
1972]
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balancing of conduct approach to the warranty problem, it is not surpris-
ing that the Fifth Circuit in the Maples case5 has taken this view, but it
is to be emphasized that that case is unique and runs strongly against the
bulk of authority. However, it would seem that an expanded interpreta-
tion of Weyerhaeuser might at least enable courts to be flexible in those
situatons where a shipowner who is greatly at fault stands to receive full
indemnification.
5 2
Jarka thus exemplifies the current tendency of federal courts to con-
strue every matter pertaining to maritime indemnity strongly against the
stevedore. In retrospect, though, it is questionable whether the Supreme
Court, when it enunciated the stevedore's implied warranty in Ryan,
3
ever contemplated that the stevedore should bear the consistent burden
of liability that federal courts have since imposed. On the contrary, it
seems apparent that the Ryan court implied the warranty of workmanlike
performance principally to alleviate the shipowner's onerous burden of
strict liability;5 contribution had been disfavored prior to Ryan, in
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.,5 and the
implied warranty was the only feasible alternative to allocate loss.
In Halcyon, a shipowner had sought unsuccessfully to obtain contri-
bution from the stevedoring company as a joint tortfeasor.50 Although it
was implicitly recognized in Halcyon that contribution might be a desira-
ble remedy for both parties, 57 the Supreme Court noted that at common
law, contribution was not generally allowed absent express legislative
assent,5" and that Congress had thoroughly preempted the field with the
defense after the breach of warranty issue has been resolved in favor of the shipowner; at
such time the burden is upon the stevedore to prove that his conduct should be execused
under this rule. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Philadelphia Ship Maint. Co., 444 F.2d 727,
732 (3d Cir. 1971). It is suggested, however, that viewing each party's conduct in isolation
may be inequitable.
511966 A.M.C. 2032 (S.D. Tex. 1966), affd, 387 F.2d 648 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 914 (1968); see text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
5'Note 21 supra.
1350 U.S. 124 (1956).
mJustice Black in his dissenting opinion indicated that shipowner's counsel had stipu-
lated that his action was not based on a contract but on common-law indemnity. He then
noted that common-law indemnity was not permitted by the Act and said,
I suppose it is for this reason that the Court purports to find an actual
contract to indemnify and thus decides the case on an issue neither pre-
sented in the complaint nor considered by the trial court.
Id. at 141-42.
55342 U.S. 282 (1952). In Halcyon, the stevedoring contractor was hired to make
repairs on Halcyon's ship, and during those repairs a longshoreman was injured. A jury
found the longshoreman 75% contributorily negligent. Id. at 283.
a'id.
5"Id. at 284-85.
mid. at 285.
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Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.59 The Court
in Halcyon therefore rejected apportionment of damages, not because
there was another, better method of allocation, but because altering the
structure of maritime recovery, so firmly imbedded in statute, was not
its function."0
The Ryan court, however, faced the Compensation Act head-on and
concluded that a warranty remedy would contravene neither the letter nor
the spirit of the Act.6 The device of the warranty, then, finally enabled
the shipowner to shift his loss if he could show professional misconduct
on the part of the stevedore.
It is thus apparent that the pervading policy against which both the
Halcyon and Ryan cases were considered was the alleviation, in some
way, of the essentially unfair burden of constant and strict liability under
which the shipowner suffered.12 Courts since Ryan, though, appear to
have placed the stevedore in a situation similar to that occupied by the
shipowner before Ryan: liability almost always falls upon him regardless
of the fault of the other party. Under this circumstance, it would appear
that the necessity for judicial alleviation of the stevedore's plight is no less
imperative than it was fifteen years ago for the shipowner. This seems
particularly true since the stevedore's problem arises from within the
judicial process by the unnecessarily harsh construction and application
of the inherently flexible legal tools of the warranty and the
Weyerhaeuser limitation. But inasmuch as the federal courts probably
will continue to mechanically apply a per se rule of stevedore liability, as
"9Id. at 285-86.
10The Halcyon Court said:
We have concluded that it would be unwise to attempt to fashion new
judicial rules of contribution and that the solution of this problem should
await congressional action.
Id. at 285.
81350 U.S. at 131-32.
2In Weinstock, The Employer's Duty to Indemnify Shipowners for Damages Re-
covered by Harbor Workers, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 321 (1954), cited in the Ryan opinion,
350 U.S. at 132 n.6, the author states:
During the past decade. . . the subject [of contribution and indemnity]
has attained special significance in connection with injuries to harbor
workers; the expansion of responsibility of shipowners has produced a
considerable body of decisions dealing with their attempts to shift the
burden of damages to the worker's employer.
Id. at 321. See also Ambler, Seamen Are "Wards of the Admiralty" but Longshoremen
Are Now More Privileged, 29 WASH. L. REv. 243 (1954).
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